Law Should Protect Life
Expresses Support for Annual March for Life
KANSAS CITY, Missouri, JAN. 18, 2011 (Zenit.org).- The bishop of Kansas City-St. Joseph is asserting that manmade law should uphold and protect human life, and citizens have the responsibility to work to ensure this.
Bishop Robert Finn affirmed this in an article published today by the diocesan newspaper, The Catholic Key.
He expressed support for the annual March for Life, which will take place in Washington, D.C. on Monday.
Each year since the Jan. 22, 1973 Supreme Court decision that legalized abortion in the United States, marchers from across the country have taken to the streets in the nation's capital in protest. The bishop noted that several buses of people from his diocese will be traveling to Washington, D.C. for the event.
Although the protest is traditionally held on the anniversary date of the Roe v. Wade decision, this year, since that day falls on a weekend, the March for Life will be held on Monday, Jan. 24, on a workday, in order to allow for the interchange of the people with their representative lawmakers.
"Almost 60 million surgical abortions have been recorded in the United States" since the court decision, Bishop Finn lamented, "the most horrendous taking of human life in history."
He added, "The numbers of abortions worldwide are certainly greater as other nations have followed our lead."
The prelate continued: "Manmade law does not, of itself, establish right and wrong.
"God grants his graces, including the inestimable gift of human life. Law must work to safeguard and protect this life, and to establish norms for the good order of society."
"If law does not honor the primacy of human life," he said, "we as citizens must work to change and improve these structures in a manner that secures man's most basic protections."
Monumental disgrace
The bishop urged: "We mustn't stop working peacefully, prayerfully, and within the legal structures of law to end abortion in our country.
"It is too monumental a disgrace to neglect or forget."
"No elected official or appointed judge is worthy of our support, if among their many acts of just advocacy they will not support the most vulnerable of our human race," he asserted.
Bishop Finn observed that "critics will sometimes suggest that 'pro-lifers' only care for people before they are born."
"The record shows that this is not true," he stated. "Our own Catholic agencies -- and so many of our parishes -- care for people at every moment, 'from the womb to the tomb.'"
The prelate added, "There is, in fact, no other private institution that does as much to aid people in need than the Catholic Church."
"And yes," he said, "we are among the most persistent champions of human life from its first moment until natural death."
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On the Net:
Full text: http://catholickey.blogspot.com/2011/01/bishop-finn-abortion-to-monumental.html
Wednesday 19 January 2011
Thursday 13 January 2011
Using Vaccines Obtained From Intentionally Aborted Human Embryos
"Is it ever morally licit to use biological material of illicit origin?"
H/T Zenit
I offer below a review of relevant Church teaching regarding this question and other helpful sources.
Relevant Church Teaching
The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's 2009 document "Dignitas Personae" (The Dignity of the Person) addresses the question regarding the use of "biological material" of illicit origin in numbers 34 and 35, and in doing to refers to relevant teaching of Pope John Paul II in his encyclical "Evangelium Vitae" (The Gospel of Life) and to the congregation's 1987 document "Donum Vitae" (Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and the Dignity of Procreation).
Number 34 of "Dignitas Personae" says the problems are cooperation in evil and giving scandal. Number 35 says that a different situation exists when researchers use "biological material" of illicit origin produced apart from their research or commercially obtained and refers to John Paul II's "Evangelum Vitae." It declares that "Donum Vitae" (Part I, No. 4) articulated the principle to be followed: "The corpses of human embryos and fetuses [...], deliberately aborted or not, must be respected just as the remains of other human beings. In particular, they cannot be subjected to mutilation or to autopsies if their death has not yet been verified and without the consent of the parents or of the mother. Furthermore, the moral requirements must be safeguarded that there be no complicity in deliberate abortion and that the risk of scandal be avoided."
Number 35 of "Dignitas Personae" considers "the criterion of independence." According to it, the use of "biological material" of illicit origin would be ethically permissible if there is a clear separation between those who produce, freeze, and cause the death of human embryos, and the researchers involved in scientific experimentation. "Dignitas Personae" expresses caution here, saying that of itself this criterion might not be sufficient.
It declares: "There is a duty to refuse to use such 'biological material' even when there is no close connection between the researcher and the actions of those who performed the artificial fertilization or the abortion, or when there was no prior agreement with the centers in which the artificial fertilization took place. This duty springs from the necessity to remove oneself, within the area of one's own research, from a gravely unjust legal situation and to affirm with clarity the value of human life. Therefore, the above-mentioned criterion of independence is necessary, but may be ethically insufficient."
But it goes on to note that "within this general picture there exist differing degrees of responsibility. Grave reasons may be morally proportionate to justify the use of such 'biological material.' Thus, for example, danger to the health of children could permit parents to use a vaccine which was developed using cell lines of illicit origin, while keeping in mind that everyone has the duty to make known their disagreement and to ask that their health care system make other types of vaccines available. Moreover, in organizations where cell lines of illicit origin are being utilized, the responsibility of those who make the decision to use them is not the same as that of those who have no voice in such a decision."
"Dignitas Personae" seems here to follow the position taken by Elio Sgreccia regarding use of a measles vaccine developed by making use of aborted fetuses; for a summary of Sgreccia's position, see "On Vaccines Made from Cells of Aborted Fetuses: Pontifical Academy for Life Response," (ZENIT, JULY 25, 2005).
Comment
Christian Brugger offers important observations on the treatment in "Dignitas Personae" of this issue (see E. Christian Brugger, "Strengths and Weaknesses of 'Dignitas Personae,'" in "Symposium on 'Dignitas Personae,'" National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly. Vol. 9.3. Autumn, 2009, 487-481). Commenting on the passage in number 35 about the duty to refuse to use such "biological material" even when there is no close connection between the researcher and the actions of those who performed the artificial fertilization or the abortion, he wonders whether this "would this apply to an epidemiologist in 2009 doing research on … cell lines … or vaccines derived from those lines, given that both were taken from electively aborted fetuses? The moral wrong -- the grave evil of abortion -- was done nearly forty-five years ago. [...]
"Is a researcher's duty to refuse to work on those materials exceptionless, even when the refusal could result in harms to the researcher and to his or her family? The text [of "Dignitas Personae"] indicates that it is not [exceptionless]. It states that grave reasons may be morally proportionate to justify the use of such 'biological material.' But the Instruction ["Dignitas Personae"], following the 2005 Pontifical Academy for Life text, "Moral Reflections on Vaccines Prepared from Cells Derived from Aborted Human Fetuses," only mentions parents consenting for grave reasons to their children's immunization. Where does this leave morally conscientious researchers?"
I think that if the research is the kind that reasonably promises to provide a great benefit to unborn human subjects who are vulnerable to specific kinds of pathologies from which the research will protect them, as was the case of the research to which Brugger refers, then the kind of exception allowed for by "Dignitas Personae," (No. 35) is present. In all likelihood this kind of exception may simply not have occurred to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in preparing the 1987 instruction "Donum Vitae."
This is a subject that needs further clarification by the Church.
* * *
William E. May, is a Senior Fellow at the Culture of Life Foundation and retired Michael J. McGivney Professor of Moral Theology at the John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family at The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C.
[Readers may send questions regarding bioethics to bioethics@zenit.org. The text should include your initials, your city and your state, province or country. The fellows at the Culture of Life Foundation will answer a select number of the questions that arrive.]
H/T Zenit
I offer below a review of relevant Church teaching regarding this question and other helpful sources.
Relevant Church Teaching
The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's 2009 document "Dignitas Personae" (The Dignity of the Person) addresses the question regarding the use of "biological material" of illicit origin in numbers 34 and 35, and in doing to refers to relevant teaching of Pope John Paul II in his encyclical "Evangelium Vitae" (The Gospel of Life) and to the congregation's 1987 document "Donum Vitae" (Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and the Dignity of Procreation).
Number 34 of "Dignitas Personae" says the problems are cooperation in evil and giving scandal. Number 35 says that a different situation exists when researchers use "biological material" of illicit origin produced apart from their research or commercially obtained and refers to John Paul II's "Evangelum Vitae." It declares that "Donum Vitae" (Part I, No. 4) articulated the principle to be followed: "The corpses of human embryos and fetuses [...], deliberately aborted or not, must be respected just as the remains of other human beings. In particular, they cannot be subjected to mutilation or to autopsies if their death has not yet been verified and without the consent of the parents or of the mother. Furthermore, the moral requirements must be safeguarded that there be no complicity in deliberate abortion and that the risk of scandal be avoided."
Number 35 of "Dignitas Personae" considers "the criterion of independence." According to it, the use of "biological material" of illicit origin would be ethically permissible if there is a clear separation between those who produce, freeze, and cause the death of human embryos, and the researchers involved in scientific experimentation. "Dignitas Personae" expresses caution here, saying that of itself this criterion might not be sufficient.
It declares: "There is a duty to refuse to use such 'biological material' even when there is no close connection between the researcher and the actions of those who performed the artificial fertilization or the abortion, or when there was no prior agreement with the centers in which the artificial fertilization took place. This duty springs from the necessity to remove oneself, within the area of one's own research, from a gravely unjust legal situation and to affirm with clarity the value of human life. Therefore, the above-mentioned criterion of independence is necessary, but may be ethically insufficient."
But it goes on to note that "within this general picture there exist differing degrees of responsibility. Grave reasons may be morally proportionate to justify the use of such 'biological material.' Thus, for example, danger to the health of children could permit parents to use a vaccine which was developed using cell lines of illicit origin, while keeping in mind that everyone has the duty to make known their disagreement and to ask that their health care system make other types of vaccines available. Moreover, in organizations where cell lines of illicit origin are being utilized, the responsibility of those who make the decision to use them is not the same as that of those who have no voice in such a decision."
"Dignitas Personae" seems here to follow the position taken by Elio Sgreccia regarding use of a measles vaccine developed by making use of aborted fetuses; for a summary of Sgreccia's position, see "On Vaccines Made from Cells of Aborted Fetuses: Pontifical Academy for Life Response," (ZENIT, JULY 25, 2005).
Comment
Christian Brugger offers important observations on the treatment in "Dignitas Personae" of this issue (see E. Christian Brugger, "Strengths and Weaknesses of 'Dignitas Personae,'" in "Symposium on 'Dignitas Personae,'" National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly. Vol. 9.3. Autumn, 2009, 487-481). Commenting on the passage in number 35 about the duty to refuse to use such "biological material" even when there is no close connection between the researcher and the actions of those who performed the artificial fertilization or the abortion, he wonders whether this "would this apply to an epidemiologist in 2009 doing research on … cell lines … or vaccines derived from those lines, given that both were taken from electively aborted fetuses? The moral wrong -- the grave evil of abortion -- was done nearly forty-five years ago. [...]
"Is a researcher's duty to refuse to work on those materials exceptionless, even when the refusal could result in harms to the researcher and to his or her family? The text [of "Dignitas Personae"] indicates that it is not [exceptionless]. It states that grave reasons may be morally proportionate to justify the use of such 'biological material.' But the Instruction ["Dignitas Personae"], following the 2005 Pontifical Academy for Life text, "Moral Reflections on Vaccines Prepared from Cells Derived from Aborted Human Fetuses," only mentions parents consenting for grave reasons to their children's immunization. Where does this leave morally conscientious researchers?"
I think that if the research is the kind that reasonably promises to provide a great benefit to unborn human subjects who are vulnerable to specific kinds of pathologies from which the research will protect them, as was the case of the research to which Brugger refers, then the kind of exception allowed for by "Dignitas Personae," (No. 35) is present. In all likelihood this kind of exception may simply not have occurred to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in preparing the 1987 instruction "Donum Vitae."
This is a subject that needs further clarification by the Church.
* * *
William E. May, is a Senior Fellow at the Culture of Life Foundation and retired Michael J. McGivney Professor of Moral Theology at the John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family at The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C.
[Readers may send questions regarding bioethics to bioethics@zenit.org. The text should include your initials, your city and your state, province or country. The fellows at the Culture of Life Foundation will answer a select number of the questions that arrive.]
Monday 10 January 2011
Designer Babies
From Breakfast TV a gay couple talk about thier plans to start [and organise] [and prescribe] their family!!!
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