It’s time for a conversation about justice, top Catholic scholar says

Famed ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre called upon academia and other Catholics and intellectuals to invest in the “expensive conversation” about justice, and to sharpen their understanding of what constitutes human dignity. MacIntyre, whose teaching career spans 70 years and includes some of the most important books on virtue ethics such as "After Virtue" and "Dependent Rational Animal," gave a reflection entitled “Human Dignity: A Puzzling and Possibly Dangerous Idea?” at the University of Notre Dame’s de Nicola Fall Conference Nov. 12. During the presentation, he argued that the modern term “human dignity” is doing the work that justice should be doing and that the current definition of human dignity and its implications have puzzling limitations. He posed the question of whether or not Hitler has human dignity— and if he does, what is he afforded by it? Can human dignity never be lost, MacIntyre asked. He analyzed the limits of the modern conception of human dignity, which differs starkly from the Thomistic understandings of "dignitas" advanced by the Belgian Thomist Charles De Koninck. According to this view, which MacIntyre asserted was a more accurate understanding of the term, human beings have dignity in virtue of what they can become--not because of the simple fact that they are persons. Accordingly, this means that human beings can also lose their dignity through sin. “A bad human being is worse than a bad animal,” he said. It also means that in order to live a dignified life, in addition to having access to basic needs such as food, clothing, and shelter, human beings must be given the chance to exercise virtues which ennoble their nature and bring it to its highest level of flourishing, MacIntyre said, adding that this requires a social restoration of the common good. MacIntyre critiqued pervasive individualist ethics, which often focus on negative prohibitions rather than the common good. He gave the example of a state that outlaws slavery, but does nothing other than allow them to live in “miserable freedom.” The elimination of evil did not ennoble the former slaves in the way it should, he argued, which is a problem of conceptualizing and seeking the common good. “One cannot have a care for human dignitas if we ascribe to political and social individualism,” he decried. MacIntyre also argued that a state that outlaws abortion, but then fails to provide basic medical and maternity care as well as economic provisions, exemplifies this same individualist ethos centered on eliminating negative prohibitions but not aimed at achieving the common good. His remarks come as the Supreme Court prepares to hear oral arguments in one of the most significant challenges to Roe v. Wade since its inception— Dobbs vs. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. Many believe Dobbs will overturn Roe. During a Q&A Nov. 12, several participants questioned MacIntyre’s assertion that human dignity be recognized in its potential form rather than by virtue of the fact that a human being is a human being, citing concerns for the implications on moral arguments against embryonic stem cell research. MacIntyre responded that too many are attempting to make the modern term human dignity— widely used in United Nations documents and constitutions in the post-war period because it allowed fighting political, religious, and philosophical factions to bridge unsurmountable gaps because of its lack of definition— to do the work that properly belongs to understanding the virtue of justice. Justice, which Aristotle defines as rendering to another person his due, is where answers to questions of embryonic stem cell research and torture properly belong, MacIntyre said. He said the dignity of an embryo, or of Hitler, lies in his or her potential and urged the attendees to have “expensive conversations” about the question “what is justice?” so they can better articulate what is owed to human beings. MacIntyre has often written about the loss of moral vocabulary and vision in today’s world. The philosopher considers this to be one of the biggest obstacles to allowing human beings to flourish, since the path to happiness through virtue is largely unknown. This was MacIntyre’s 20th contribution to the de Nicola Fall Conference on Ethics.

What does it mean to be human?

ht The Humanum Institute 

Very interesting discussion addressing the question of ‘What it means to be human’ what are the implications for the law if we separate the ideology of ‘self’ from relationship with the body. 
 

Brains in a dish pose ethical problems

 

H/t Bioedge 

A recent feature in Nature opens with the following sentence: “In Alysson Muotri’s laboratory, hundreds of miniature human brains, the size of sesame seeds, float in Petri dishes, sparking with electrical activity.”

Dr Muotri, a Brazilian researcher working at the University of California, San Diego, is investigating what makes us uniquely human. The obvious answer is the brain, so he is studying it from an evolutionary and developmental perspective and differentiating stem cells to recreate "brain organoids" in his lab.

His research is quite innovative. For instance, he has compared the DNA of Neanderthals (taken from the fossil record and DNA samples from bones) with our DNA. This could give clues about why Neanderthal social, cultural and technological development was more limited and why they became extinct. This might lead to insights into mental health.

However, what his website blurb skates over is the difficult ethical questions arising from creating brain organoids. Nature points out that some scientists and ethicists argue that some experiments with organoids should not be allowed.

It appears that most researchers believe that it would be unethical to create organoids which have some degree of consciousness – disembodied brains floating in a petri dish. However, there’s very little agreement about what consciousness is. Philosophers have clashed over this for centuries; neuroscientists have been no more fortunate in reaching a conclusion. In the meantime, researchers like Muotri are forging ahead. He believes that he might need to create consciousness as part of his research.

In his view, brain organoid research offers no special difficulties. “We work with animal models that are conscious and there are no problems,” Muotri told Nature. “We need to move forward and if it turns out they become conscious, to be honest I don’t see it as a big deal.”

This horrified Wesley J. Smith, bioethics writer at National Review: “That crass attitude illustrates the huge peril biotech could pose to human decency. As the great moral philosopher Leon Kass once wrote, ‘shallow are the souls that have forgotten how to shudder.’”

Once again, the Vatican slams euthanasia

h/t Bioedge

 

If anyone were unsure of where the Catholic Church stood on assisted suicide and euthanasia, they can have no doubts now. In a lengthy document titled Samaritanus Bonus (“the good Samaritan”), the Vatican has released a lengthy response to the spread of “assisted dying”.

Assisted suicide or euthanasia or both are permitted in the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Colombia, Switzerland, eight states in the United States plus the District of Columbia, and two states in Australia. A number of other countries are considering legalisation.

The document is clear and emphatic: euthanasia is “an intrinsically evil act, in every situation or circumstance”.

As well, anyone who cooperates is guilty as well, even those who defend legalisation. 

“Euthanasia is an act of homicide that no end can justify and that does not tolerate any form of complicity or active or passive collaboration. Those who approve laws of euthanasia and assisted suicide, therefore, become accomplices of a grave sin that others will execute. They are also guilty of scandal because by such laws they contribute to the distortion of conscience, even among the faithful.”

The Church’s opposition is hardly news. More than 50 years ago the Second Vatican Council condemned euthanasia. Long before the Netherlands legalised it in 2002, Pope John Paul II forbade it in an encyclical, Evangelium Vitae (“the Gospel of Life”). However, the disagreeable reality of legalisation presents problems for Catholics – and other Christians who oppose it in theory. Should people who request assisted suicide or euthanasia receive the Church’s last rites? Should they be given a Christian funeral?

Some bishops appeared to lean toward a policy of demonstrating compassion by “accompanying” a person who chooses to die in this way.

Samaritanus Bonus puts the kibosh on this. People who request assisted suicide or euthanasia may not receive the Church’s sacraments. Even membership in an association organising “assisted dying” is forbidden. They “must manifest the intention of cancelling such a registration before receiving the sacraments”.

Whilst this sounds harsh, the document acknowledges that in extremis people may be so distressed that they are not fully responsible for choosing this kind of death. It urges priests to look for “adequate signs of conversion”. But in principle, there should be no cooperation whatsoever:

Those who spiritually assist these persons should avoid any gesture, such as remaining until the euthanasia is performed, that could be interpreted as approval of this action. Such a presence could imply complicity in this act. This principle applies in a particular way, but is not limited to, chaplains in the healthcare systems where euthanasia is practiced, for they must not give scandal by behaving in a manner that makes them complicit in the termination of human life.

Familiar stuff, perhaps, for friends and foes of Catholicism.

What’s different about this document is that it also offers a perceptive bioethical analysis of euthanasia, along with theological prescriptions.

The principal justification for euthanasia is autonomy. It’s my life; I can do what I want with it. Nobody can tell me what to do. We have to respect a patient’s autonomous decision. Choosing the time and place of death is the ultimate affirmation of autonomy, etc. The arguments are nearly always drawn straight from the playbook of the 19th century British philosopher John Stuart Mill.

The philosophy underlying the secular arguments deployed in Samaritanus Bonus is completely different. Instead of departing from the autonomy of the patient, it emphasises the universal experience of vulnerability.

For the fully autonomous man, think of lron Man in the Marvel Universe. Zipping around in his suit of armour, he is invulnerable. But what makes him interesting is the fact that Tony Stark is vulnerable. He suffers from PTSD, narcissism and loneliness. It’s not the strength of Iron Man’s armour that makes him human, but the fragility of Tony Stark’s character.

Which is more or less what the Vatican says:

“The need for medical care is born in the vulnerability of the human condition in its finitude and limitations. Each person’s vulnerability is encoded in our nature as a unity of body and soul: we are materially and temporally finite, and yet we have a longing for the infinite and a destiny that is eternal. As creatures who are by nature finite, yet nonetheless destined for eternity, we depend on material goods and on the mutual support of other persons, and also on our original, deep connection with God.“

Given this vision of what a human being is, the appropriate response to illness is not to kill a patient, but to care for him.

“Our vulnerability forms the basis for an ethics of care, especially in the medical field, which is expressed in concern, dedication, shared participation and responsibility towards the women and men entrusted to us for material and spiritual assistance in their hour of need.“

Furthermore, the document points out that measuring a patient’s dignity by his autonomy leads to the contradiction which has always bedevilled Mill’s theory. How can the highest expression of autonomy be to extinguish it? If that were true, couldn’t we choose to sell ourselves into slavery to settle our debts? No. “Just as we cannot make another person our slave, even if they ask to be, so we cannot directly choose to take the life of another, even if they request it,” it points out.

“Therefore, to end the life of a sick person who requests euthanasia is by no means to acknowledge and respect their autonomy, but on the contrary to disavow the value of both their freedom, now under the sway of suffering and illness, and of their life by excluding any further possibility of human relationship, of sensing the meaning of their existence, or of growth in the theologal life. Moreover, it is to take the place of God in deciding the moment of death.“

The document also makes some very shrewd observations about the implications of pretending that we are Iron Man instead of acknowledging ruefully that underneath we are really Tony Stark.

In fact, if autonomy is the highest value, people whose autonomy is impaired are in trouble.

“Those who find themselves in a state of dependence and unable to realize a perfect autonomy and reciprocity, come to be cared for as a favor to them. The concept of the good is thus reduced to a social accord: each one receives the treatment and assistance that autonomy or social and economic utility make possible or expedient. As a result, interpersonal relationships are impoverished, becoming fragile in the absence of supernatural charity, and of that human solidarity and social support necessary to face the most difficult moments and decisions of life.”

In short, the proper response to Tony Stark’s end-of-life existential crisis is not to end his life, but to lavish care upon him, to treat him as unique and precious (which is what happens in Avengers: Endgame)

Should we sacrifice older people to save the economy?

h/t Bioedge

A senior Republican politician from Texas sparked a media firestorm this week after suggesting that older people should consider sacrificing their lives for the economy in the face of the coronavirus crisis. 

Dan Patrick, a former radio talk show host who is now Lieutenant Governor of Texas, made the comments on Monday night while talking to Fox News presenter Tucker Carlson. 

In response to a question about lifting social distancing measures, Patrick said, 

“Let’s get back to living...Let’s be smart about it. And those of us who are 70-plus, we’ll take care of ourselves, but don’t sacrifice the country.”

Patrick expressed grave concern that the COVID-19 crisis could “bring about a total economic collapse” and “potentially the collapse of our society”, and said that many “grandparents” like himself would be willing to expose themselves to a higher level of risk to save the economy. 

The comments made headlines across the US, with ethicists and commentators labelling Patrick's views "simplistic" and "odd". 

Peter Wehner, a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, said that Patrick’s comments were premature, and were inconsistent with the pro-life values of the Republican Party. 

“There’s an attitude toward the elderly of ‘Let them eat cake,’ ” said Wehner, who has worked in three Republican administrations. “This is very odd for the pro-life party that for so long it pushed a certain ethic”. 

Ashish Jha, a professor of global health at Harvard University, accused Patrick of setting up a false dichotomy between public health and the economy. 

“It is possibly the dumbest debate we’re having...People are being incredibly simplistic and are not thinking through this beyond the next two weeks. The number of people who have emailed me and said, have you thought about the economic effects? You know, it turns out, I’ve thought about that!”

Patrick’s comments were followed the next day by a statement from President Trump that he would like to see “the country opened” by Easter. “You’re going to lose more people by putting a country into a massive recession or depression,” Trump told reporters during a White House News Conference on Tuesday.  

US ethicists issue utilitarian manifesto for coronavirus rationing

h/t Bioedge

As the US braces itself for an exponential increase in COVID-19 cases, several US doctors and ethicists have published an article arguing forcefully for utilitarian healthcare rationing. 

The new article -- published in the New England Journal of Medicine on Monday -- deals with the complexities of the current COVID-19 crisis in the United States, and considers how scarce resources such as ventilators and vaccines should be allocated in light of our current understanding of the disease and pandemic modelling. 

The lead author of the article, academic and influential healthcare policy commentator Ezekiel Emanuel, has previously written at length about the allocation of scarce lifesaving resources, and, specifically, the allocation of vaccines in a pandemic. 

In this article, Emanuel and colleagues argue that healthcare rationing in the COVID-19 pandemic is inevitable: “...unless the epidemic curve of infected individuals is flattened over a very long period of time — the Covid-19 pandemic is likely to cause a shortage of hospital beds, ICU beds, and ventilators”. 

The real question, the authors suggest, “is not whether to set priorities, but how to do so ethically and consistently”. 

But what should our ethical framework for resource allocation look like? 

“In the context of a pandemic, the value of maximizing benefits is most important”, the authors argue.

Where we are allocating ventilators, for example, we should prioritise those patients who have the greatest likelihood of survival if given access to a ventilator, but who would be unlikely to survive otherwise. This would likely mean prioritising younger patients: 

“Operationalizing the value of maximizing benefits means that people who are sick but could recover if treated are given priority over those who are unlikely to recover even if treated and those who are likely to recover without treatment. Because young, severely ill patients will often comprise many of those who are sick but could recover with treatment, this operationalization also has the effect of giving priority to those who are worst off in the sense of being at risk of dying young and not having a full life.” 

The authors also note that rationing may mean withdrawing treatment from some patients who have a poorer prognosis than others. 

“Because maximizing benefits is paramount in a pandemic, we believe that removing a patient from a ventilator or an ICU bed to provide it to others in need is also justifiable and that patients should be made aware of this possibility at admission”.

The withdrawal of treatment is not the same as killing, they argue: 

...many guidelines agree that the decision to withdraw a scarce resource to save others is not an act of killing and does not require the patient’s consent. We agree with these guidelines that it is the ethical thing to do.” 

The authors also consider how we should allocate a coronavirus vaccine, should one be developed. The moral calculus is inverted in this case, they suggest. While younger, healthier patients should be given priority access to ICU, older patients with chronic illnesses should be given priority access to a vaccine: 

“...younger patients should not be prioritized for Covid-19 vaccines, which prevent disease rather than cure it, or for experimental post- or pre-exposure prophylaxis. Covid-19 outcomes have been significantly worse in older persons and those with chronic conditions. Invoking the value of maximizing saving lives justifies giving older persons priority for vaccines immediately after health care workers and first responders”. 

In an op-ed in the New York Times, Emanuel and two co-authors of the study stressed the importance of high-level ethical reflection on pandemic rationing, and warned of the risk of front line clinicians making “well-intentioned, but ad hoc choices under extreme pressure”.  

But some commentators are concerned that the high-level ethical reflection so far has missed some of the most serious ethical challenges presented by the COVID-19 crisis. In a letter to the Times, Former Democratic Congressman Tony Coelho said some medical professionals were trying to marginalize seniors and the disabled: 

“Even in a crisis, self-designated “experts” are trying to marginalize people with disabilities and seniors. Instead, let’s develop policies that “flatten the curve” and prepare to treat all those who may find themselves vulnerable to Covid-19”.  

Xavier Symons is Deputy editor of BioEdge 

Bioethicists defend euthanasia for mentally ill

by Xavier Symons | 9 Oct 2019 | h/t Bioedge

A new edition of the American Journal of Bioethics explores the theme of euthanasia for mentally ill persons. Several well-known commentators on euthanasia argue that in principle euthanasia should not be prohibited for people suffering from severe psychiatric disorders. 

The journal discussion is built around a target article by Brent Kious and Marget Battin from the University of Utah. Battin is a long-time proponent of voluntary euthanasia, while Kious is a psychiatrist who specialises in severe and persistent mental illness. The authors argue that euthanasia for the mentally ill is morally indistinct from euthanasia for physical terminal illness: 

“We think it is clear that the suffering associated with mental illnesses can sometimes be as severe, intractable, and prolonged as the suffering due to physical illnesses. Accordingly, it seems to us that if severe suffering can justify [physician assisted dying] for some persons with terminal physical illnesses, it should justify [physician assisted dying] for some persons with mental illnesses, too. Call this the parity argument.” 

To resist the parity argument, some scholars claim that terminality (i.e., the presence of a terminal illness) is morally relevant as patients who request euthanasia are dying already. Yet Kious and Battin argue that suffering, not terminality, is the ultimate justification that motives lawmakers to legalise euthanasia: “Terminality is...merely a safeguard, and not a rationale, for [physician assisted dying]”.

Other scholars argue that persons with mental illness lack the capacity to make decisions about ending their own life. Kious and Battin acknowledge that severe mental illness can greatly affect capacity, but they suggest that this does not rule out the possibility that some persons with severe psychiatric disorders are capable of making an autonomous decision to end their life. Indeed, in some cases we may be denying competent persons the right to a humane death:  

“by forbidding [physician assisted death] in [cases of] mental illness we could [be denying] much-needed succor to a person who is suffering severely and whose request for death is reasonable and made with full capacity”.

While several of the open peer commentaries are supportive of Kious and Battin’s basic proposal, a commentary by Charles Foster (University of Oxford) takes the parity argument in the opposite direction. Foster argues that the parity argument is in fact a reason to prohibit euthanasia all together: 

“Kious and Battin are right to assert that there is no distinction of substance between physical and psychiatric suffering, and that the presence of psychiatric suffering does not necessarily connote incapacity (although in practice it often will)...[yet the authors] have reached precisely the wrong conclusion using, in part, precisely the right reasoning. The right conclusion is not that the ambit of legally sanctioned physician-assisted suicide (PAS) should be widened, but that it should be narrowed: Indeed, PAS should be unlawful”.

IVF 'mix up': US couple say they gave birth to wrong children

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h/t The BBC News website

#Image copyrightSCIENCE PHOTO LIBRARY

Image captionThe couple said they turned to IVF after years of trying to have children

An Asian couple who tried to conceive through IVF has claimed that a mix-up at a California fertility clinic left them pregnant with the wrong children.

A lawsuit filed by the couple in New York states that the couple was shocked to give birth to two boys who were not of Asian descent, US media reported.

The lawsuit says DNA tests confirmed the children were not related to the couple and they relinquished custody.

The fertility clinic has not commented on the allegations.

The couple - identified in the lawsuit only as AP and YZ to minimise the "embarrassment and humiliation" - say they tried for years to get pregnant before spending more than $100,000 (£80,000) on the IVF, or in vitro fertilisation, including medication, laboratory fees, travel and other costs.

IVF is the process of fertilising an egg outside of the woman's body, before returning it to the womb to grow and develop.

The lawsuit, filed in the Eastern District of New York last week, accuses CHA Fertility and two men identified as its co-owners and directors of offences including medical malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

It reportedly notes that after giving birth on 30 March, the couple "was shocked to see that the babies they were told were formed using both of their genetic material did not appear to be".

There were earlier signs that things were amiss when a scan revealed they were expecting boys, despite the fact that the doctors had said they did not use male embryos during the treatment.

Doctors reportedly told the couple that the scan was inaccurate, before they went on to have the baby boys in April. In addition to not being related to the couple, the children were not related to each other, according to the lawsuit.

On its website, CHA Fertility says it delivers the "highest degree of personalized care...with the utmost sense of duty".

The BBC has contacted the company for comment.

Lawyers for the couple told the BBC their clients suffered from "the grossly negligent and reckless conduct of CHA fertility".

"Our goal in filing this lawsuit is to obtain compensation for our clients' losses, as well as to ensure that this tragedy never happens again," the lawyers said.

Three-parent babies green-lighted in the UK

h/t Bioedge

A genetically engineered baby could be born in the UK before Christmas. The UK government has given a licence to Newcastle University to create three-parent embryos to combat mitochondrial diseases.

The UK’s fertility authority, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority(HFEA), had already announced in December that licences for the controversial procedure were to be granted on a case-by-case basis. It appears that a number of couples have applied for the procedure, so the University will have no trouble in enrolling patients.

Sally Cheshire, chair of the UK’s fertility authority, said: “I can confirm today that the HFEA has approved the first application by Newcastle Fertility at Life for the use of mitochondrial donation to treat patients. This significant decision represents the culmination of many years hard work by researchers, clinical experts, and regulators, who collectively paved the way for Parliament to change the law in  2015 to permit the use of such techniques.

“Patients will now be able to apply individually to the HFEA to undergo mitochondrial donation treatment at Newcastle, which will be life-changing for them, as they seek to avoid passing on serious genetic diseases to future generations.”

Critics described the move as “ethically reckless”. Mark Bhagwandin, of the pro-life charity Life, told the Daily Telegraph:

“We had hoped that the HFEA would have listened to the thousands of people who have expressed concern about three parent embryos. Instead it has ignored the alarm bells and approved a procedure which will alter the human genome. It is at the very least reckless and irresponsible given that we have absolutely no idea what the long term consequences are to us interfering with the human genome.
"Whilst we are deeply sympathetic to the plight of people with mitochondrial related diseases, the end does not always justify the means. Our understandable search for therapies to help overcome illness and disabilities must be done in an ethical way and balanced against the unconditional acceptance of all human beings, whatever differences they may have."

New Zealand river declared a legal person

h/t Bioedge

In the latest wrinkle in debates over personhood, a Māori iwi (tribe) in New Zealand has succeeded in getting Parliament to recognise the Whanganui River as a legal person.

"It's not that we've changed our worldview, but people are catching up to seeing things the way that we see them," Adrian Rurawhe, a Māori member of Parliament. The North Island river, New Zealand’s third longest, also known by its Māori name of Te Awa Tupua, will be represented by two legal guardians, one appointed by the iwi and the other by the government.

The settlement, which has been in dispute for at least 140 years, also includes NZ$80 million in financial redress and $30 million toward improving the environmental, social, cultural and economic health and well-being of Te Awa Tupua. 

Riverine personhood is an untested concept in a Western legal system. According to the government, Te Awa Tupua will now have its own legal personality with all the corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a legal person. Lawyers say that the river cannot vote and cannot be charged with homicide if people drown in it. But it will have to pay taxes, if liable. The gender of the river is unspecified at the moment.

"I know the initial inclination of some people will say it's pretty strange to give a natural resource a legal personality," said New Zealand's Treaty Negotiations Minister Chris Finlayson. "But it's no stranger than family trusts, or companies or incorporated societies."

As soon as the third reading of the bill passed, members of the gallery broke into a waiata (a song of celebration) which is well worth watching. 

Personhood and moral status: the debate continues

Personhood debates have dominated much of the bioethics discourse for the past few decades, yet little consensus has been reached. Two insightful articles recently published online in the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy may provide much needed clarity on the issues involved.
In an essay on ‘moral status questions’ about embryos, ethicist Shane Maxwell Wilkins of Fordham University debunks a series of criticisms made against proponents of the inherent moral status of embryos.
Ethicists like Robert P. George and Christopher F. Tollefsen appear to have been misrepresented by a number of their most vocal critics. As Wilkins writes, George and Tollefsen are often criticised for making an ostensibly illicit inference from the biological peculiarity of embryos to the morally unique status of embryonic cells. This, however, is a caricature of their position:

“[George and Tollefsen] deploy the concept of an ‘active disposition’… If an active disposition to develop into an adult human being is morally salient, then it makes sense to say that the one-celled embryo has moral status, whereas every individual cell of an adult human being in isolation lacks it.”

Wikins also refutes the view that embryos are not sufficiently distinct from a mother’s uterus to be considered independent entities. Wilkins distinguishes causal independence from ontological independence, saying we don’t need the former to prove that the child is a distinct entity. “[all that the argument] requires is the much weaker claim that the embryo is ontologically independent of the mother.”
In a similar essay to Wilkins, Andrew McGee of Queensland University of Technology’s Centre for Ethics and Health Law has critiqued arguments advanced by Jeff McMahon and Derick Parfit, which try to make a case for the non-personhood of embryos and patients in a persistent vegetative state.
McMahon offers two key arguments for the non-personhood of embryonic and PVS humans.
The first involves the rare case of dicephalic twins who share almost all vital organs, but have distinct brains and assumedly distinct mental lives. McMahon says that cases like these are good reason to locate personhood not in the body but in consciousness. He then proceeds to use this as evidence to suggest that embryos and vegetative patients are not persons, but rather ‘human organisms’ sans the moral standing of persons.
Yet as McGee points out, McMahon does little to justify his conclusion that the twins are somehow one human organism. There is a good argument to be made to say they are actually two organisms despite being closely connected (or alternatively, there may be just one organism with two heads).
McMahon’s second argument relies on a hypothetical thought experiment about twins, of whom one has his brain transplanted into the corpse of the other (yes, it is rather crazy). McMahon claims that the twin who receives the new body is still the same person, despite losing his old body. And this, he suggests, is evidence that it is not a person that is killed in early term abortions or the withdrawal of a feeding tube from a PVS patient; it is rather a mere “human organism”.
McGee takes issue with McMahon on this as well. As McGee states, in ordinary circumstances the word “person” has built into it assumptions about the centrality of bodily continuity to personal identity.

 “our current concepts of person and personal identity include both bodily identity and psychological continuity…McMahon leaves this criterion [i.e. bodily identity] out of his account, not realizing that he has subtly dropped one of our current criteria for the identity and identification of persons”.

Person in the way we use the word it is not just about psychological continuity, and so the transplant argument doesn't get off the ground.