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The Vatican has urged Catholics to get vaccinated against coronavirus and said it is “morally acceptable” to take vaccines that use cell lines from aborted foetuses.
Cells derived from foetuses aborted decades ago have been used by some researchers working on vaccines against Covid-19.
The Vatican acknowledged that the issue was a cause of concern for some Catholics but said in a note that “it is morally acceptable to receive Covid-19 vaccines that have used cell lines from aborted foetuses in their research and production process”.
The use of such vaccines “does not constitute formal cooperation with the abortion from which the cells used in production of the vaccines derive”, it said.
The Vatican added that while vaccination “must be voluntary ... in the absence of other means to stop or even prevent the epidemic, the common good may recommend vaccination, especially to protect the weakest and most exposed”.
Those who refuse to use vaccines “must do their utmost to avoid” spreading infection, it added.
The note also highlighted the “moral imperative” of the pharmaceutical industry, governments and international organisations to ensure that vaccines “are also accessible to the poorest countries”.
Italy will go into a nationwide lockdown during the Christmas and new year period. The whole country will be under “red-zone” lockdown between Christmas Eve and 27 December, then again between 31 December and 3 January, and several more periods into the new year.
H/T Bioedge
by Michael Cook | 29 Nov 2020 |
What will bioethics look like after Covid-19? The experience of lockdowns, social isolation, fear of an invisible enemy, deference to experts, and dependence could change perceptions of how we approach ethical dilemmas.
Ruth Chadwick, co-editor of the journal Bioethics, muses in a recent editorial on the vehemence of public opinion about lockdown. “A survey undertaken by the UK think tank Demos found that 12% of mask wearers said they ‘hate’ those who do not wear face coverings, while 14% of lockdown respecters expressed the same emotion towards rule breakers.”
What does this suggest about the principles of bioethics? “Hatred is several steps beyond social disapproval. It suggests that there may be something more here than concerns about the free rider problem, or even worries about direct threats to one’s personal safety, if people are being regarded as ‘bad’ regardless of the relative riskiness of their behaviour in particular situations.”
Perhaps more reflection on solidarity is called for and less on autonomy. “Perhaps most striking, however, in the light of the Demos findings, is the question of what the conditions for the possibility of social solidarity might be,” she writes, “and the implications for the applicability and usefulness of the principle of solidarity in bioethics.”
Chadwick is the latest of a number of bioethicists – from very diverse schools of thought – who are questioning the dominant paradigm of autonomy. Carter Snead argues that autonomy presents “an incomplete and false vision of human identity and flourishing” which defines a human being “as an atomized and solitary will”. Laura Williamson contended recently that autonomy is of little use in ethical discussions about substance abusers. And Craig Klugman pointed out that “Bioethics has pushed too far in the direction of the individual and needs to have a turn toward the importance of the community and the common good.”
Michael Cook is editor of BioEdge
Very interesting discussion addressing the question of ‘What it means to be human’ what are the implications for the law if we separate the ideology of ‘self’ from relationship with the body.
H/t Bioedge
A recent feature in Nature opens with the following sentence: “In Alysson Muotri’s laboratory, hundreds of miniature human brains, the size of sesame seeds, float in Petri dishes, sparking with electrical activity.”
Dr Muotri, a Brazilian researcher working at the University of California, San Diego, is investigating what makes us uniquely human. The obvious answer is the brain, so he is studying it from an evolutionary and developmental perspective and differentiating stem cells to recreate "brain organoids" in his lab.
His research is quite innovative. For instance, he has compared the DNA of Neanderthals (taken from the fossil record and DNA samples from bones) with our DNA. This could give clues about why Neanderthal social, cultural and technological development was more limited and why they became extinct. This might lead to insights into mental health.
However, what his website blurb skates over is the difficult ethical questions arising from creating brain organoids. Nature points out that some scientists and ethicists argue that some experiments with organoids should not be allowed.
It appears that most researchers believe that it would be unethical to create organoids which have some degree of consciousness – disembodied brains floating in a petri dish. However, there’s very little agreement about what consciousness is. Philosophers have clashed over this for centuries; neuroscientists have been no more fortunate in reaching a conclusion. In the meantime, researchers like Muotri are forging ahead. He believes that he might need to create consciousness as part of his research.
In his view, brain organoid research offers no special difficulties. “We work with animal models that are conscious and there are no problems,” Muotri told Nature. “We need to move forward and if it turns out they become conscious, to be honest I don’t see it as a big deal.”
This horrified Wesley J. Smith, bioethics writer at National Review: “That crass attitude illustrates the huge peril biotech could pose to human decency. As the great moral philosopher Leon Kass once wrote, ‘shallow are the souls that have forgotten how to shudder.’”
h/t Bioedge
If anyone were unsure of where the Catholic Church stood on assisted suicide and euthanasia, they can have no doubts now. In a lengthy document titled Samaritanus Bonus (“the good Samaritan”), the Vatican has released a lengthy response to the spread of “assisted dying”.
Assisted suicide or euthanasia or both are permitted in the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Colombia, Switzerland, eight states in the United States plus the District of Columbia, and two states in Australia. A number of other countries are considering legalisation.
The document is clear and emphatic: euthanasia is “an intrinsically evil act, in every situation or circumstance”.
As well, anyone who cooperates is guilty as well, even those who defend legalisation.
“Euthanasia is an act of homicide that no end can justify and that does not tolerate any form of complicity or active or passive collaboration. Those who approve laws of euthanasia and assisted suicide, therefore, become accomplices of a grave sin that others will execute. They are also guilty of scandal because by such laws they contribute to the distortion of conscience, even among the faithful.”
The Church’s opposition is hardly news. More than 50 years ago the Second Vatican Council condemned euthanasia. Long before the Netherlands legalised it in 2002, Pope John Paul II forbade it in an encyclical, Evangelium Vitae (“the Gospel of Life”). However, the disagreeable reality of legalisation presents problems for Catholics – and other Christians who oppose it in theory. Should people who request assisted suicide or euthanasia receive the Church’s last rites? Should they be given a Christian funeral?
Some bishops appeared to lean toward a policy of demonstrating compassion by “accompanying” a person who chooses to die in this way.
Samaritanus Bonus puts the kibosh on this. People who request assisted suicide or euthanasia may not receive the Church’s sacraments. Even membership in an association organising “assisted dying” is forbidden. They “must manifest the intention of cancelling such a registration before receiving the sacraments”.
Whilst this sounds harsh, the document acknowledges that in extremis people may be so distressed that they are not fully responsible for choosing this kind of death. It urges priests to look for “adequate signs of conversion”. But in principle, there should be no cooperation whatsoever:
Those who spiritually assist these persons should avoid any gesture, such as remaining until the euthanasia is performed, that could be interpreted as approval of this action. Such a presence could imply complicity in this act. This principle applies in a particular way, but is not limited to, chaplains in the healthcare systems where euthanasia is practiced, for they must not give scandal by behaving in a manner that makes them complicit in the termination of human life.
Familiar stuff, perhaps, for friends and foes of Catholicism.
What’s different about this document is that it also offers a perceptive bioethical analysis of euthanasia, along with theological prescriptions.
The principal justification for euthanasia is autonomy. It’s my life; I can do what I want with it. Nobody can tell me what to do. We have to respect a patient’s autonomous decision. Choosing the time and place of death is the ultimate affirmation of autonomy, etc. The arguments are nearly always drawn straight from the playbook of the 19th century British philosopher John Stuart Mill.
The philosophy underlying the secular arguments deployed in Samaritanus Bonus is completely different. Instead of departing from the autonomy of the patient, it emphasises the universal experience of vulnerability.
For the fully autonomous man, think of lron Man in the Marvel Universe. Zipping around in his suit of armour, he is invulnerable. But what makes him interesting is the fact that Tony Stark is vulnerable. He suffers from PTSD, narcissism and loneliness. It’s not the strength of Iron Man’s armour that makes him human, but the fragility of Tony Stark’s character.
Which is more or less what the Vatican says:
“The need for medical care is born in the vulnerability of the human condition in its finitude and limitations. Each person’s vulnerability is encoded in our nature as a unity of body and soul: we are materially and temporally finite, and yet we have a longing for the infinite and a destiny that is eternal. As creatures who are by nature finite, yet nonetheless destined for eternity, we depend on material goods and on the mutual support of other persons, and also on our original, deep connection with God.“
Given this vision of what a human being is, the appropriate response to illness is not to kill a patient, but to care for him.
“Our vulnerability forms the basis for an ethics of care, especially in the medical field, which is expressed in concern, dedication, shared participation and responsibility towards the women and men entrusted to us for material and spiritual assistance in their hour of need.“
Furthermore, the document points out that measuring a patient’s dignity by his autonomy leads to the contradiction which has always bedevilled Mill’s theory. How can the highest expression of autonomy be to extinguish it? If that were true, couldn’t we choose to sell ourselves into slavery to settle our debts? No. “Just as we cannot make another person our slave, even if they ask to be, so we cannot directly choose to take the life of another, even if they request it,” it points out.
“Therefore, to end the life of a sick person who requests euthanasia is by no means to acknowledge and respect their autonomy, but on the contrary to disavow the value of both their freedom, now under the sway of suffering and illness, and of their life by excluding any further possibility of human relationship, of sensing the meaning of their existence, or of growth in the theologal life. Moreover, it is to take the place of God in deciding the moment of death.“
The document also makes some very shrewd observations about the implications of pretending that we are Iron Man instead of acknowledging ruefully that underneath we are really Tony Stark.
In fact, if autonomy is the highest value, people whose autonomy is impaired are in trouble.
“Those who find themselves in a state of dependence and unable to realize a perfect autonomy and reciprocity, come to be cared for as a favor to them. The concept of the good is thus reduced to a social accord: each one receives the treatment and assistance that autonomy or social and economic utility make possible or expedient. As a result, interpersonal relationships are impoverished, becoming fragile in the absence of supernatural charity, and of that human solidarity and social support necessary to face the most difficult moments and decisions of life.”
In short, the proper response to Tony Stark’s end-of-life existential crisis is not to end his life, but to lavish care upon him, to treat him as unique and precious (which is what happens in Avengers: Endgame)
“Let’s get back to living...Let’s be smart about it. And those of us who are 70-plus, we’ll take care of ourselves, but don’t sacrifice the country.”
“It is possibly the dumbest debate we’re having...People are being incredibly simplistic and are not thinking through this beyond the next two weeks. The number of people who have emailed me and said, have you thought about the economic effects? You know, it turns out, I’ve thought about that!”
“Operationalizing the value of maximizing benefits means that people who are sick but could recover if treated are given priority over those who are unlikely to recover even if treated and those who are likely to recover without treatment. Because young, severely ill patients will often comprise many of those who are sick but could recover with treatment, this operationalization also has the effect of giving priority to those who are worst off in the sense of being at risk of dying young and not having a full life.”
“Because maximizing benefits is paramount in a pandemic, we believe that removing a patient from a ventilator or an ICU bed to provide it to others in need is also justifiable and that patients should be made aware of this possibility at admission”.
...many guidelines agree that the decision to withdraw a scarce resource to save others is not an act of killing and does not require the patient’s consent. We agree with these guidelines that it is the ethical thing to do.”
“...younger patients should not be prioritized for Covid-19 vaccines, which prevent disease rather than cure it, or for experimental post- or pre-exposure prophylaxis. Covid-19 outcomes have been significantly worse in older persons and those with chronic conditions. Invoking the value of maximizing saving lives justifies giving older persons priority for vaccines immediately after health care workers and first responders”.
“Even in a crisis, self-designated “experts” are trying to marginalize people with disabilities and seniors. Instead, let’s develop policies that “flatten the curve” and prepare to treat all those who may find themselves vulnerable to Covid-19”.
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